Friday, January 31, 2020

How Private Equity Buried Payless

How Private Equity Buried Payless 

Finance-driven capitalism was supposed to make the economy more dynamic. A failed shoe chain shows why it hasn’t happened. 

By Neil Irwin NY Times

TOPEKA, Kan. — The financiers who had taken over Payless Shoe Source didn’t have much experience selling low-priced footwear, but they had big ideas about how things ought to be done. One was capitalizing on enthusiasm for the 2018 World Cup in the Latin American countries where the company had hundreds of stores. 

When they saw an opportunity to buy a million pairs of World Cup-branded flip-flops, the money men turned shoe sellers overruled the midlevel supply managers at corporate headquarters in Topeka, who had pointed out a couple of problems. 

First, the sandals mostly wouldn’t arrive on store shelves until after the World Cup was over. 

Second, they were branded with the flags of countries like Mexico and Argentina — countries where Payless didn’t have any stores. 

Ultimately, the flip-flops had to be unloaded at steep markdowns, one of many missteps at a company that by early 2019 would liquidate its stores in the United States and enter its second bankruptcy in rapid succession, putting 16,000 people out of work. (It emerged from bankruptcy last month, with its third ownership group in four years.) 

As in any corporate failure, there is no one cause. Over seven years, Payless went through a wringer of private equity and hedge fund stewardship that left it with inadequate technology, run-down stores and no financial cushion to survive an era of upheaval in retail. 

But the collapse of Payless is more than a story of one discount shoe company that couldn’t hack it in a changing business environment. It provides disquieting clues about one of the great mysteries of the modern economy. 

Why hasn’t the finance-driven capitalism of the last few decades created faster growth? What if the masters of financial efficiency are making choices that don’t actually create the more dynamic, productive economy they promise? 

In extreme cases, what if they don’t really know what they’re doing at all? 

The rise of the buyout kings 

The difference between economies that thrive and those that falter boils down to two related factors: how effectively capital is deployed, and how well corporations are governed. 

When a nation’s savings are channeled toward worthwhile projects, and effective managers are put in charge of large companies, good things tend to result. When resources are devoted to boondoggles, and companies are run by incompetent cronies, everyone ends up poorer. Think of how much richer West Germany became compared with East Germany over the four decades the country was divided. 

But there is no single answer to the question of what form of capital allocation and corporate governance works best. The United States has typically relied on stock and bond markets to determine which companies get money to invest, and on independent boards of directors to govern companies. Western Europe relies more heavily on banks. Japan and South Korea have relied on conglomerates in which families of companies help finance and govern one another. 

In the last generation, the United States has experienced a revolution in how this corporate control works. 

In the 1980s, the first generation of leveraged buyout kings — an industry now known as private equity — identified problems with American corporations. Many were poorly run, led by complacent boards of directors and executive teams reluctant to shake things up. 

Buyout firms aimed to purchase those companies, fix what was holding them back, and profit by making them more valuable and selling them off again. All through the 1990s and early 2000s, this shift made billionaires of their founders and attracted trillions of dollars from investors. 

Their imprint on the economy is enormous: Companies owned by private equity firms accounted for 8.8 million jobs in the United States in 2018, and 5 percent of G.D.P. 

But if anything, that understates the scale of the financialization of American business, and the ways that management tactics of buyout kings have become the norm. 

Some large hedge funds operate similarly to private equity firms, by buying and operating companies. One such fund, Alden Global Capital, controlled Payless from 2017 to 2019, the years that included the World Cup blunder. Other hedge funds use votes to get executives of publicly traded companies to act more aggressively and thus increase returns to shareholders. 

The result: Financial managers exert greater control over nearly all American companies than they once did. 

Their willingness to cause some pain — to close factories, lay people off, renegotiate arrangements with longtime suppliers — is, many economists argue, a feature, not a bug. Society becomes richer over time by devoting resources to its most productive uses. The pain should be temporary, and in theory result in a more vibrant economy for everyone. 

In 2012, private equity firms and hedge funds set their sights on the troubled retailing sector, and one set of investors made the pilgrimage to Topeka, where they acquired Payless. 

More shoes, fewer salesmen 

Payless, founded in 1956 by two cousins in Topeka, Louis and Shaol Pozez, was a business built on an innovation: that shoe salesmen weren’t entirely necessary. 

Rather than keep inventory in a back room and employ lots of salespeople, as department stores did, Payless kept boxes of shoes on open display in the store, where customers could help themselves to try on. It needed fewer workers for every pair of shoes sold, which, among other cost-savings measures, allowed it to keep prices lower than many competitors could. The company became a mainstay of the indoor malls and strip shopping centers that boomed in the second half of the 20th century. 

By the time a private equity group led by Golden Gate Capital and Blum Capital, both of San Francisco, took over in 2012 in a $2 billion acquisition, Payless had 4,300 stores worldwide and $2.4 billion in revenue. But it also faced profound challenges. 

Many malls and shopping centers were entering a death spiral, with falling foot traffic, store closings and underinvestment. People were increasingly buying shoes online, along with most everything else. Payless had underinvested in its information technology infrastructure. 

It also had some distinctive strengths. In its 800-person corporate headquarters in Topeka, a former warehouse located between a women’s prison and a potato salad manufacturing plant, it had the personnel and systems to pull off an intricate feat of merchandising and supply chain management. 

The company managed to commission the manufacture of millions of pairs of shoes, often imitating the look of more fashionable brands; ship them from factories in China, Vietnam and other countries to distribution centers in the United States; and then, just in time, get those shoes into the stores where they would most appeal to the customer base. 

It did all this at remarkably low cost; its average pair of shoes sold for $17. 

What needed doing was evident to Payless’s own managers and outside analysts alike: shutter underperforming stores, update others, and modernize its technology to compete in the digital age. 

The new owners found a new C.E.O. in W. Paul Jones, a veteran of two retailers owned by financial engineers: Sears under the hedge fund manager Eddie Lampert and Shopko under the private equity firm Sun Capital Partners. 

Mr. Jones had seen up close both the strengths and weaknesses of this form of financialized corporate control. “They’re incredibly valuable on the financial metrics of understanding how to get costs out of the business, how to be more streamlined, how to think about the organizational structure differently, how to find nickels and dimes throughout the organization,” and at getting maximum value out of real estate, Mr. Jones said. 

“But they do not, do not, know how to operate a retail company,” he said. 

That is to say, on the actual nuts and bolts of retail — creating a compelling shopping experience, with merchandise that buyers want — financial managers are out of their depth. 

But he was confident that Payless under Golden Gate and Blum would be an exception. The new owners appeared to understand the business better than others in the private equity industry, Mr. Jones said, and they were committed to hiring a first-rate team of executives. 

That optimism was conveyed to employees at the corporate headquarters in Topeka. Soon after the takeover, managers gathered in a small auditorium. 

“Everybody was a little bit on edge,” Thad Halstead, a merchandise manager, recalled. “But it was positive. They were saying: ‘Our goal is to help you. We’re here to make sure you guys have the resources to succeed for the next hundred years.’” 

Dunkin' Donuts is an example of a company that emerged from private equity ownership stronger than it went in.

The private equity productivity puzzle 

Plenty of companies that go through this process do emerge better managed, with capital deployed more wisely. 

The Carlyle Group, for example, took over Dunkin’ Donuts in 2006 and spun it off to public markets in 2011 financially stronger and with 2,800 more stores worldwide. The hotel group Hilton Worldwide nearly doubled the number of rooms it managed from 2007 to 2018, while under control of the Blackstone Group. 

And some of the best research on how the buyout industry affects the companies involved suggests that, on average, they become more productive. 

Steven J. Davis, an economist at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and five co-authors analyzed thousands of private equity buyouts between 1980 and 2013. Among other things, they found that in the two years after a firm was bought out, labor productivity — the revenue generated per employee — rose by 7.5 percent more than at otherwise comparable firms that were not acquired. The largest gains came at older and larger buyout targets. 

This would seem to fit the story that the private equity industry tells about itself: that it is creating more dynamic, productive companies by running them more effectively than the traditional system of self-perpetuating boards of directors and publicly traded shares. 

But there is a problem. During this same period in which American corporations have become more financialized than ever, the overall economy has had historically weak productivity growth. 

In the 2010s, labor productivity — the amount of economic output per hour of work — has risen by less than 1 percent a year, the lowest of any decade on record (the data go back to 1947). It was 2.7 percent per year during the 1950s and 1960s, the high-water mark of the clunky, complacent, conglomerate-building era of American business. 

That may not seem like a big difference but sustained over time it has huge effects. At 1960s rates of productivity growth, incomes would be expected to double every 26 years. At 2010s rates, it would take 72 years. 

The American economy has become markedly less dynamic. Fewer businesses are being started, and the newcomers are having less success unseating incumbents. Workers are less likely to change jobs, which suggests labor is not moving toward the most productive forms of work. Many major industries are becoming more concentrated among a few giants. 

Mr. Davis, the University of Chicago economist, says these trends would be worse if not for the buyout industry. 

“Private equity buyouts are a force pushing the other direction against the headwinds,” he said. “If you think the reallocation of jobs and capital and workers to more productive use is an important part of how we drive productivity growth and generate higher living standards, the role of private equity is more vital, because there seems to be less of that going on in the economy than 20 or 30 years ago.” 

It also could be true that the slump in productivity and dynamism has nothing to do with the revolution in how companies are governed and capital allocated. The slump could result from fewer transformative innovations, for example — essentially bad luck. 

But at a minimum, it doesn’t appear that the rise of this seemingly superior form of stewarding American business has created a more robust overall economy. And Payless offers some clues as to why. 

Trouble in the supply chain 

The new C.E.O., Mr. Jones, and the rest of the executive team assembled by Payless’s new private equity owners in 2012 had a lot to do. 

The company had modernized its logo and branding years earlier — but had been so stingy with capital spending that around 70 percent of stores still had 1980s vintage signs. The company’s outdated information technology systems updated inventory only once a day — making it impractical to offer buy-online, pick-up-in-store offerings. 

Mr. Jones and his team started in on plans to upgrade technology, expand profitable international operations and invest in the high-growth areas of athletic footwear. But even with all those outdated stores and technology, capital spending remained only at levels comparable to the previous ownership: $75 million to $80 million per year. 

Meanwhile, the company made huge payments to its private equity owners. 

In the two-year period ending in January 2015, Payless generated $249 million in “Ebitda,” a common metric for operating profits; paid $352 million in one-time dividends to shareholders; and made $94 million in interest payments. 

For every dollar that came in the door of the company in that span, it paid out $1.41 to its owners and 38 cents to its lenders. That left the company with less of a financial cushion to ride out any future challenges. And the future, as it turned out, held some major challenges. 

In 2015, longshoremen at major West Coast ports went on a slowdown at the worst possible time for Payless: just as ships from Asia containing millions of pairs of discount shoes were steaming across the Pacific ahead of the crucial spring sales season. 

Inventory waited offshore for weeks, creating a cascade of problems for the Payless supply chain: a pileup of out-of-season shoes that the company was able to sell only at deep discounts and with extra spending on marketing. 

The resulting losses strained the company’s ability to repay its debts and led to credit downgrades. “It’s just this vortex that you’re stuck in, trying to get out of it,” Mr. Jones said. “And that’s what caused the crisis.” 

But it was the financial structure of the company that made it possible for a labor disruption to push the company into that vortex. “Yes, taking out the money, in hindsight, made the business more vulnerable, susceptible, and in an environment of so much uncertainty that nobody understood,” Mr. Jones said of the dividend paid to shareholders. “In hindsight, we shouldn’t have done it.” 

Golden Gate Capital said that it was focused on helping the company grow and that it was undone by powerful forces. 

“We recruited a strong management team, and over $500 million was invested to support Payless’s turnaround strategy,” the private equity firm said in a statement. “Unfortunately, like many retailers, Payless ultimately faced challenges too strong to overcome without an operational and financial restructuring.” 

How to boost profits and impress investors 

Think about any company where you’ve worked. Suppose a new owner took aggressive actions to try to achieve immediate financial returns. 

It might pay out cash on the balance sheet as dividends rather than let it sit around for a rainy day. It might rely more on borrowed money. It might raise prices abruptly, or cut payroll, or try to renegotiate deals with landlords and suppliers. 

In other words, it might follow the private equity industry’s playbook. 

And those efforts may create an apparent boost in productivity. So long as revenue and earnings rise faster than the amount of labor, it would look like a win for the overall economy, at least in the first few years. 

But at the ground level, there would be no guarantee that the company was actually doing anything better. All those changes would make a company more profitable. But they wouldn’t necessarily result in a product that consumers preferred, or in a more effective deployment of workers and equipment. 

Moreover, a riskier corporate balance sheet might be fine when things are going well, but increase the risk of a catastrophic failure when things go wrong — essentially hollowing out whatever productive capacity made the company successful to begin with. 

Just maybe, in other words, what Payless went through in its run of private equity ownership wasn’t just one bad deal in one troubled industry, but a particularly clear example of what is holding the entire economy back. 

A swift return to bankruptcy 

Done right, a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is an opportunity for a company’s rebirth. It can shed the debts, lease obligations or onerous supplier contracts that might have gotten it in trouble. 

The executives who led the company through its 2017 bankruptcy were confident they had done exactly that. The company shed about half of the debt on its balance sheet, closed about 700 underperforming stores, got its rent on remaining stores cut by as much as 50 percent, negotiated more favorable credit terms with suppliers, and formed a plan to invest in new technology and expand its profitable Latin American business. 

“We were going the right direction, we had stability, we had a strategy, we had a team, and we had results,” Mr. Jones said. He said the new owners should have had at least four years of breathing room to get the business on track. Golden Gate Capital, in its statement, said, “When we exited Payless, we left it with a right-sized store footprint and meaningful earnings opportunities for future owners.” 

“It’s the antithesis of what we’ve seen in other retail bankruptcies,” a restructuring expert, Christopher Jarvinen, told Reuters at the time. 

Yet 18 months later, Payless was in bankruptcy court again. Its United States stores were closed. 

What happened? Why did Alden Global Capital, the firm that took over Payless after the restructuring, fail so badly? 

One answer is that it is hard to fix decades’ worth of problems quickly, even with the help of a bankruptcy court that can wipe out debts. For example, the Alden managers enthusiastically demonstrated a new system with which store employees could call up information on a tablet to see if desired shoes were available in another store. 

That sort of thing was pretty standard in the retail industry in 2018. Yet many Payless stores had inadequate Wi-Fi for the tablets to be used. And the bankruptcy had fractured the company’s relationships with suppliers, many of them small Chinese manufacturers that had lost money when Payless experienced its cash crunch. 

Former employees also described a series of mystifying errors by an Alden-installed leadership team with little or no experience in the retail industry. The chairman and interim C.E.O., Martin R. Wade III, was a longtime investment banker. His chief deputy, Jennifer Wild, was also new to the sector. 

Executives from the earlier ownership were involved in the transition while the company was in Chapter 11; they recalled answering questions from the new team about some of the basics of retail supply chains and merchandising strategy. 

Beyond their lack of retail experience, former employees said the Alden team cloistered itself in the executive suite and seemed to disdain the expertise of the staff in Topeka. 

“What they thought was that people who live here are stupid, and that’s the way they treated us,” said Meghan Shreve, who was a manager in corporate communications. “It didn’t matter how great you were in your field or what other stuff you had done, it was, ‘You live in Kansas, so you’re an idiot.’” 

Seeking to streamline the company’s supply process, the company shut down a lab in China where shoes were inspected before being exported. Instead, quality assurance workers inspected shoes in factories. 

Bad orders began slipping through. At one point, a big order of shoes with mislabeled sizes — a size 6 shoe with size 3 printed on it, for example — showed up at the distribution center in Ohio. 

“Missing one shoe can wipe out whatever you think you’re saving,” said Dustin Watson, a former planning and allocation manager. 



Then there were the sandals. “Someone in Colombia isn’t going to buy Mexico-themed flip-flops, and they definitely won’t buy them if they don’t get there in time for the World Cup,” said Jason Tryon, a planning and allocation manager. Those concerns, he said, were ignored. “They became convinced that, ‘You guys don’t know what you’re talking about.’” 

Mr. Wade, the interim chief executive during this period, said he and his colleagues had inherited a business in worse shape than it had appeared. 

“The company had extremely deep flaws that had been building over the years,” he said. “One could argue that it was close to insolvency the day we took over.” 

He said he had needed to “make terminations” with the Topeka staff “because we did not have runway and we needed to move quickly.” 

He disputed the idea that his leadership group lacked retail experience, noting he had hired several seasoned executives and consultants. Moreover, he said, “the steering committee that hired me had their choice of at least 25 very experienced people whose whole careers were in retail.” 

“So why me?” he said. “I believe they felt that they needed a leader; they needed someone who had experience changing culture, and who is not afraid of bringing in people with more expertise than he had in order to turn the company around.” 

He attributed missteps like the World Cup flip-flops to the need to experiment and innovate — including successful efforts like a marketing stunt to trick fashion influencers into believing Payless shoes were from a luxury brand. 

Definitely destruction, but was it creative? 

Payless is now a carcass of a company, with no stores in the United States and a relative handful of employees in a headquarters that once held 800. 

There’s a certain model of capitalism under which this failure, painful as it was for those who lost their jobs, is a win over all. Strong, well-managed companies rise up and replace failures, producing a more competitive economy that benefits everyone over the long run. 

But there’s an alternate way of viewing things. 

For one thing, plenty of retail companies are doing reasonably well, making sound tactical decisions around store closings and smart investments in digital retail. 

Payless wasn’t hopeless, said Beth Goldstein, a footwear industry analyst at NPD Group: “It would have needed significant investment and right-sizing, and it wouldn’t be up to the level of what it was 10 years ago, but there would still be a business.” 

Instead, Ms. Goldstein concludes, much of the sales Payless once made migrated to just three other retailers: Walmart, Target and Amazon, including through its Zappos subsidiary. 

What do the most successful markets look like? They feature lots of rivals in constant competition, always testing new strategies as they compete for workers, suppliers and customers. That’s what makes a truly dynamic economy, the kind where creative destruction of all types can occur. 

The death of Payless eliminated several hundred well-paying corporate headquarters jobs in Topeka, as well as thousands more jobs in stores. And it hurt creditors, landlords and suppliers. 

But it also left behind a discount shoe industry that is much more dominated by a handful of the biggest companies, which will have that much more power and incentive to entrench their advantages and keep dynamism at bay. 

When you look at it that way, the private equity paradox is no more a mystery than why you hold on to plenty of cash for a rainy day, or why a Colombian doesn’t want Mexican-themed World Cup flip-flops after the World Cup is over. 

Wednesday, January 29, 2020

Two Shopkeepers, Their Cat and Part of Paris’s Soul

Departing: Two Shopkeepers, Their Cat and Part of Paris’s Soul 

Un afflux de magasins de luxe pousse les entreprises locales du Marais, du quartier juif historique et du L.G.B.T. centre de Paris. Parmi les victimes figure un minimart, dirigé depuis plus de 35 ans par deux frères marocains.

“We know everyone here, we’ve lived our lives with them and we’re sad to leave,” said Ali Sitayeb, center.Credit...Dmitry Kostyukov for The New York Times 

By Liz Alderman  NY Times


PARIS — On a recent evening, Amar Sitayeb squeezed behind a tiny counter at the minimart that he and his older brother Ali have run for more than 35 years in the Marais district of central Paris. A plump gray tabby cat prowled the floor, and faded photos of neighborhood babies, many now grown-ups, were taped to an old cash register. 

A stream of regulars filed in, grabbing potato chips, gum and soda, and lingering to exchange gossip and pleasantries. One neighbor with the sniffles bought honey and tea. Mr. Sitayeb fished mint for her from a refrigerator. “This should help,” he said. 

Ten minutes later, she returned and asked for rum. “That’ll attack the cold quicker!” he laughed, pulling a bottle from the shelf. 

The purchases were mainly an excuse to spend precious moments bantering with the Sitayeb brothers, known to residents around the rue Sainte-Croix de la Bretonnerie, a boutique-studded Marais street, as the eyes, ears and unofficial mayors of the area. 

For soon, the unthinkable is set to happen: On Jan. 31, their store, Au Marché du Marais, will close, swept away in a tide of moneyed gentrification, like nearly every other independent shop and cafe around them. 

“We know everyone here, we’ve lived our lives with them and we’re sad to leave,” said Ali Sitayeb, a fatherly figure who recently turned 70, but exuded a much younger energy. In place of the daily necessities that his store offers, like toilet paper and freshly squeezed orange juice, he announced, a Princesse Tam Tam lingerie chain would be installed. 

When I first heard the news, I was stunned. I had settled near the épicerie after moving to Paris in 2000. Since then, an incursion of designer boutiques had accelerated, turning the area into an outdoor shopping arena that draws thousands of visitors. 

The brothers, who originally came from Morocco, remained steady fixtures throughout, greeting me on my way to work, dispensing witticisms and advice, and peppering me with questions about a succession of American presidents. 

My neighbors were in mourning. The épicerie was a rare gathering spot, and the brothers, with alert eyes and sunny mustachioed faces, kept vigil over everyone. They held people’s keys and knew all the latest news on marriages, divorces, children, thefts, rivalries, real estate deals — the list goes on. 

Theirs, however, is a tale of a rapidly changing Paris. And the closing of their shop, on a street where boutiques now sell 585 euro designer sneakers, has sparked angst among residents who see a warning in how big money-backed luxury brands aimed at wealthy tourists are consuming neighborhoods and eroding cultural identity. 

“This changes everything,” said Eva Beau, a doctor who has lived near the shop for 20 years. “I feel like breaking all of this — it’s too sad,” Dr. Beau added, her eyes brimming with tears as she scrutinized the luxury storefronts. 

Dr. Beau used to lower a basket with a rope from her fourth-floor apartment, into which the brothers would place coffee and other orders. “The neighborhood doesn’t need more boutiques,” she said. “We need the human contact of people like Ali and Amar.” 

Ali Sitayeb with a customer. The closure of the shop has sparked angst among residents.Credit...Dmitry Kostyukov for The New York Times 

The brothers had long debated when to retire. When an electrical fire ravaged the shop five years ago, support from neighbors was so strong that they decided to keep going. But then the lingerie chain, run by Fast Retailing, a Japanese retail giant that owns Uniqlo, Theory and Comptoir des Cotonniers, made an advantageous offer for the space. 

The pattern is playing out in cities across France. From Aix-en-Provence to Reims, Tours and Strasbourg, bakeries, cafes and shops are increasingly being taken over by retail conglomerates with vast financial resources. The stores look like quaint boutiques, yet the money behind them is formidable. 

Near the Sitayebs’ shop, the Sandro, Maje and Claudie Pierlot clothing chains expanded under the ownership of the American private equity firm KKR before being taken over by the Chinese textile giant Shandong Ruyi. 

Lacoste and Kooples, which replaced a bakery and bookstore, belong to Maus Frères, Switzerland’s largest privately held retail group. Chanel and LVMH Moët Hennessy opened perfume and makeup stores, intensifying a surge in Marais real estate prices. 

Adding to the pressure is the rise of late-night convenience stores backed by the supermarket giants Casino Groupe and Carrefour. The increased competition has shuttered scores of corner shops in Paris, many run by immigrants from North Africa. 

Across France, bakeries, cafes and shops are increasingly being taken over by retail conglomerates with vast financial resources.Credit...Dmitry Kostyukov for The New York Times 

“It’s money that makes the laws,” said Ali Sitayeb’s son, Tariq, 34, who helps run the épicerie but no longer counts on taking over. 

The Sitayebs left Morocco in the 1970s as teenagers to earn a living as waiters and dishwashers in Parisian restaurants. But they found they could prosper more by operating a convenience mart well past the traditional 7 p.m. closing time of French retailers. 

When the brothers opened the shop in 1984, François Mitterrand was president, prices were in French francs and the Marais, the historic Jewish quarter of Paris, was evolving from a gritty working-class textile and metal factory district. Butchers and boulangeries honeycombed the area. Yiddish was heard everywhere along the rue des Rosiers. 

As cafes, bars and artisanal boutiques moved in, the Marais became the center for Paris’s L.G.B.T. community, drawing more visitors and prompting an ever more vibrant makeover. 

While the Marais had already developed when I arrived, the influx of luxury storefronts has exploded since Europe’s economic and debt crisis ended in 2012, squeezing out residential and L.G.B.T. commerce, and taking over the historic Jewish center. 

Ali, left, and Amar Sitayeb in front of their mini-mart. While they were looking forward to spending time with their families, “it’s very hard for us to go,” Amar said.Credit...Dmitry Kostyukov for The New York Times 

“This used to be a real neighborhood, with families and kids,” Amar Sitayeb said, as crowds of tourists strolled past on a recent weekend. “Now, all that’s disappeared.” 

Jean Luc Rouillard, 67, a denizen since 1980, chimed in. 

“The Marais has lost its soul,” he declared. 

“That’s closing,” Mr. Rouillard said, pointing to a 45-year-old antique shop being dismantled for a luxury hotel. “And that’s closing,” he added, eyeing Au Rendez-Vous des Amis, a neighborhood cafe that had just shuttered to make way for a hamburger joint. 

“That too,” he continued, nodding to Les Mots à la Bouche, the oldest L.G.B.T. bookseller in the Marais, rumored to be converted soon to a Doc Martens shoe store after the lease became unaffordable. “It’s dramatic,” he said. 

As locals contemplated the end of an era, they arranged a surprise party for the brothers on a recent weekday at Le Point Virgule, a small comedy theater next to the shop. 

Neighbors filed in silently: Dr. Beau and her daughter Manon, 21; Vincent Douget, a former chef at the cafe; Henriette Delyfer, an art boutique owner who knew the brothers since she was a child; local police officers who had dropped in regularly to chat over orange juice. 

At last the brothers arrived. They were speechless at the surprise. Tears misted their eyes. While they were looking forward to spending time with their families, “it’s very hard for us to go,” Amar Sitayeb said. 

When the brothers opened the shop in 1984, François Mitterrand was president, prices were in French francs and the Marais was evolving from a gritty working-class textile and metal factory district.Credit...Dmitry Kostyukov for The New York Times 

“They were the heart of this area,” said George Fischer, a retiree who has lived next to the shop for two decades. 

Back at the épicerie, Tariq Sitayeb had prepared a potent rum punch and Moroccan pastries to welcome a growing crowd. 

Ariel Weil, the mayor of Paris’s 4th arrondissement, appeared and shook Ali Sitayeb’s hand. A circle formed as neighbors lamented the Marais’ latest transformation. 

“It’s just clothes, clothes, clothes,” Mr. Fischer said. “How is a bra going to replace my orange juice?” 

“On a personal level I’m sad,” Mr. Weil said. “And as mayor, I’m worried that we can’t find a solution to keep small businesses from leaving.” 

Ali Sitayeb looked at his watch and sighed. It was his brother’s turn to man the register, and he had to get home to rest. Tomorrow, they would continue the sobering task of winding down the store. 

“People don’t want things to change,” said Tariq Sitayeb, as his father faded into the dark night. 

“But a page is turning.”

Tuesday, January 28, 2020

Electricity turns garbage into graphene



Electricity turns garbage into graphene 


By Robert F. Service AAAS 2020Electricity turns garbage into graphene


Science doesn’t usually take after fairy tales. But Rumpelstiltskin, the magical imp who spun straw into gold, would be impressed with the latest chemical wizardry. Researchers at Rice University report today in Nature that they can zap virtually any source of solid carbon, from food scraps to old car tires, and turn it into graphene—sheets of carbon atoms prized for applications ranging from high-strength plastic to flexible electronics. Current techniques yield tiny quantities of picture-perfect graphene or up to tons of less prized graphene chunks; the new method already produces grams per day of near-pristine graphene in the lab, and researchers are now scaling it up to kilograms per day. 


“This work is pioneering from a scientific and practical standpoint” as it promises to make graphene cheap enough to use to strengthen asphalt or paint, says Ray Baughman, a chemist at the University of Texas, Dallas. “I wish I had thought of it.” The researchers have already founded a new startup company, Universal Matter, to commercialize their waste-to-graphene process. 

With atom-thin sheets of carbon atoms arranged like chicken wire, graphene is stronger than steel, conducts electricity and heat better than copper, and can serve as an impermeable barrier preventing metals from rusting. But since its 2004 discovery, high-quality graphene—either single sheets or just a few stacked layers—has remained expensive to make and purify on an industrial scale. That’s not a problem for making diminutive devices such as high-speed transistors and efficient light-emitting diodes. But current techniques, which make graphene by depositing it from a vapor, are too costly for many high-volume applications. And higher throughput approaches, such as peeling graphene from chunks of the mineral graphite, produce flecks composed of up to 50 graphene layers that are not ideal for most applications. 

Graphene comes in many forms. Single sheets, which are ideal for electronics and optics, can be grown using a method called chemical vapor deposition. But it produces only tiny amounts. For large volumes, companies commonly use a technique called liquid exfoliation. They start with chunks of graphite, which is just myriad stacked graphene layers. Then they use acids and solvents, as well as mechanical grinding, to shear off flakes. This approach typically produces tiny platelets each made up of 20 to 50 layers of graphene. 

In 2014, James Tour, a chemist at Rice, and his colleagues found they could make a pure form of graphene—each piece just a few layers thick—by zapping a form of amorphous carbon called carbon black with a laser. Brief pulses heated the carbon to more than 3000 kelvins, snapping the bonds between carbon atoms. As the cloud of carbon cooled, it coalesced into the most stable structure possible, graphene. But the approach still produced only tiny qualities and required a lot of energy. 

Two years ago, Luong Xuan Duy, one of Tour’s graduate students, read that other researchers had created metal nanoparticles by zapping a material with electricity, creating the same brief blast of heat behind the success of the laser graphene approach. “I wondered if I could use that to heat a carbon source and produce graphene,” Duy says. So, he put a dash of carbon black in a clear glass vial and zapped it with 400 volts for about 200 milliseconds. Initially he got junk. But after a bit of tweaking, he managed to create a bright yellowish white flash, indicating the temperature inside the vial was reaching about 3000 kelvins. Chemical tests revealed he had produced graphene. 

It turned out to be a type of graphene that is ideal for bulk uses. As the carbon atoms condense to form graphene, they don’t have time to stack in a regular pattern, as they do in graphite. The result is a material known as turbostatic graphene, with graphene layers jumbled at all angles atop one another. “That’s a good thing,” Duy says. When added to water or other solvents, turbostatic graphene remains suspended instead of clumping up, allowing each fleck of the material to interact with whatever composite it’s added to. 

“This will make it a very good material for applications,” says Monica Craciun, a materials physicist at the University of Exeter. In 2018, she and her colleagues reported that adding graphene to concrete more than doubled its compressive strength. Tour’s team saw much the same result. When they added just 0.05% by weight of their flash-produced graphene to concrete, the compressive strength rose 25%; graphene added to polydimethylsiloxane, a common plastic, boosted its strength by 250%. 

Those results could reignite efforts to use graphene in a wide range of composites. Researchers in Italy reported recently that adding graphene to asphalt dramatically reduces its tendency to fracture and more than doubles its life span. Last year, Iterchimica, an Italian company, began to test a 250-meter stretch of road in Milan paved with graphene-spiked asphalt. Tests elsewhere have shown that adding graphene to paint dramatically improves corrosion resistance. 

These applications would require high-quality graphene by the ton. Fortunately, the starting point for flash graphene could hardly be cheaper or more abundant: Virtually any organic matter, including coffee grounds, food scraps, old tires, and plastic bottles, can be vaporized to make the material. “We’re turning garbage into graphene,” Duy says.


Friday, January 17, 2020

An Ever More Perfect Novel




An Ever More Perfect Novel 


The Great American Novel? Why are we still banging on about that old thing? 


TYLER MALONE
The Hedgehog Review


Tyler Malone has written for the Los Angeles Times, Lapham’s Quarterly, the LA Review of Books, and other publications. 

Near the end of Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, the white-whale-obsessed Captain Ahab shouts, “The ship! The hearse—the second hearse!... its wood could only be American!” The same could be said of the book itself: Its wood, too, could only be American. Which is why it is so often nominated for that distinctive laurel, the Great American Novel. 

Other classic contenders include James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans, Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter, Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, William Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury, Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man, and Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. To that list could be added more recent challengers: Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho, David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest, Thomas Pynchon’s Mason and Dixon, and Don DeLillo’s Underworld, to name but a few. Then there are the dark horse candidates, the lesser-known, lesser-read gems like Ross Lockridge Jr.’s Raintree County and John Dos Passos’s U.S.A. trilogy, which are no less worthy of inclusion. Should Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises be considered even though it is set outside the United States? Should Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita be in the running, even though Nabokov lived in America for only a quarter of his life? What are the parameters and qualifications for this literary heavyweight title? 

I can imagine what some readers must be thinking. The Great American Novel? Why are we still banging on about that old thing? I, too, have been skeptical of the title and its pursuit. But the times have changed me, changed us all. Earlier this year, a Gallup Poll showed that in the Trump era “American pride” has hit an all-time low. And as we’re told almost daily, we’re more divided as a nation now than at any time since the Civil War. In this fractious season, I’ve begun to re-evaluate my estimation of the Great American Novel. Precisely because it was once one of our perdurable national myths, shouldn’t we think twice before consigning the idea to the attic of sentimental, has-been notions? 

The United States being a relatively young country, it stands to reason that our myths would have been—and to an extent, still would be—less thickly woven into the fabric of our national consciousness than those of countries that had many more centuries to fashion theirs. Yet this very lack of historical depth had just the opposite effect. Americans propagated and embraced national myths with an urgency clearly driven by need. Consider just a few: The American Dream. Manifest Destiny. The Shining City upon a Hill. The Separation of Church and State. All Men Are Created Equal. The First Thanksgiving. Pocahontas and John Smith. George Washington and the Cherry Tree. Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. One Nation Indivisible. 

Perhaps it’s no surprise that the Great American Novel was born in 1868, only a few years after the end of the Civil War. Writing in The Nation, John William DeForest formulated the notion, defining it not just as the best novel by an American author but as “the picture of the ordinary emotions and manners of American existence.” DeForest argued that Hawthorne, whom he lauded as having “the greatest of American imaginations,” fell short of achieving the accolade. Although books such as The Scarlet Letter were “full of acute spiritual analysis,” the characters belonged to “the wide realm of art rather than to our nationality.” Indeed, DeForest found them to be “as probably natives of the furthest mountains of Cathay or of the moon as of the United State of America.” The Great American Novel, he determined, must take up the “task of painting the American soul within the framework of a novel.” 

That the formulation of the Great American Novel came in the wake of a bloody conflict that split the country in two reveals much: Americans yearned for myths that would renew their sense of common purpose, that would encourage them to reexamine their foundational values and guiding principles, their darkest sins and loftiest aspirations. Americans needed a reckoning with themselves, and the Great American Novel promised to be just that. It makes sense, then, that DeForest settled on Uncle Tom’s Cabin, by Harriet Beecher Stowe, as “the nearest approach to the desired phenomenon.” He pointed out several of the book’s “very noticeable faults,” but it nonetheless struck him as “a picture of American life, drawn with a few strong and passionate strokes.” 

Perhaps the main reason Americans needed the concept of the Great American Novel, particularly after the Civil War, was their struggle with self-definition, something Europeans addressed largely by invoking lineage, ethnicity, and language (though as much scholarship has shown, Europeans often had to do a lot of retroactive “inventing” to transform loose congeries of nations into modern nation-states). Like the crew of the Pequod in Moby-Dick, America has always been a nation of “renegades and castaways” from disparate races, creeds, and cultures. As elements in a “melting pot,” Americans were never of a single ethnicity; nor did many of them maintain a deep connection with their pre-American lineage. Even though they had thrown off the British colonial yoke, their language was, in a sense, borrowed, and therefore not uniquely their own. Focusing on the one thing they had to themselves and in common—their Americanness, that intangible character that had been called into question by the Confederacy’s attempt at secession—was still their best way to define themselves without the props used by Europeans. 

The British novelist and essayist Martin Amis, a keen observer of Americans at work and play, put it this way in his 2015 introduction to Saul Bellow’s The Adventures of Augie March: “As its culture was evolving, and as cultural self-consciousness dawned, America found itself to be a youthful, vast and various land, peopled by non-Americans. So how about this place? Was it a continental holding-camp of Greeks, Jews, Brits, Italians, Scandinavians and Lithuanians, together with the remaining Amerindians from ice-age Mongolia? Or was it a nation, with an identity—with a soul? Who could begin to give the answer? Among such diversity, who could crystallize the American experience?” 

Added to the need for self-definition was a palpable sense of cultural inferiority, voiced by many mid-nineteenth-century literary luminaries, Ralph Waldo Emerson being perhaps the most prominent. Even if their nation had existed for less than a century, these writers believed they had failed to achieve cultural self-sufficiency and independence. They rated American works of art and literature as sadly derivative, pale and puerile imitations of European achievements. As Lawrence Buell, a noted scholar of antebellum American letters, has pointed out, the Great American Novel “is the brainchild of a bygone era, of anxious collective hand-wringing throughout the nineteenth century and beyond about what seemed to be the maddeningly slow emergence of a robust national literary voice—an anxiety that now seems all the more overblown for underestimating what had already been accomplished, such as Thoreau’s Walden, Melville’s Moby-Dick, and Whitman’s Leaves of Grass.” 

As much as it might have been needed, the concept of the Great American Novel soon encountered resistance. In 1897, the poet Bliss Carman claimed that “the great American novel is like the sea-serpent, an unrealised monster which is discovered about once every six months, and is never seen by more than three people at a time.” In the years since, it has been compared to just about every mythical creature in the bestiary: the “chimera” (Martin Amis), the “unicorn” (Richard G. Stern), the “gryphon” (David Kipen), the “elusive siren” (C.E. Morgan), “the hippogriff” (Frank Norris), “the yeti or the Loch Ness monster” (A.O. Scott), even “God” (Henry Allen). 

If it is to endure, every national narrative must absorb its counternarrative; Carman’s “unrealised monster,” a characterization meant to mock and maim the long-standing hope for the Great American Novel, has helped only to keep the concept alive. Every year, more and more pronunciamentos are published declaring the Great American Novel useless, outdated, dead. But are reports of its death—like those ill-timed ones announcing Mark Twain’s demise—just a tad premature? We might count ourselves lucky if they are. 

We might even reflect on the fact that there’s no extensive mythology built around “the Great Russian Novel,” “the Great French Novel,” or “the Great German Novel.” What makes the concept, again in Amis’s words, “so essentially American,” is how it dovetails with so many of our other national myths: “Like most quests, the quest for the Great American Novel seemed destined to be endless.... As with the pursuit of happiness, the pursuit was the thing; you were never going to catch up.” 

While the United States spent the nineteenth century expanding westward, pushed on by a supposed Manifest Destiny, this wasn’t the only directional movement. Another equally important movement continued apace, one that Barack Obama, as a presidential candidate, called our attempt to form an “ever more perfect union.” Borrowing the phrase “more perfect union” from the Preamble to the Constitution, Obama added “ever” (as others had before him) to get at perhaps the core American myth of progress that undergirds all the other myths that bind our union together. 

At the same time, Obama’s wording acknowledges that a truly perfect union is unattainable because there is “ever more” to be achieved. America is a project that is continually trying to make its disparate parts—its foundational diversity in every sense—come together. But there will always be more work to be done. 

If America is continually rewriting itself, moving toward some better unification of its manifold parts while simultaneously acknowledging the inability to achieve such a union, then clearly the task of the Great American Novel must be to mirror this process of creating an ever more perfect union. 

Indeed, the real problem with the Great American Novel may be with the article we use to introduce it. Rather than the, might the more democratic article a reflect more truly the connection with our deepest myth? There’s no shame in hoping to read or attempting to write a novel whose “wood could only be American.” The shame is in not realizing that the Great American Novel is being constantly rewritten, one over the other over the other, the lineaments of the earlier versions still discernible in the newer ones—a palimpsest destiny rather than a manifest one.



Wednesday, January 8, 2020

Before the ‘Final Solution’ There Was a ‘Test Killing’


Before the ‘Final Solution’ There Was a ‘Test Killing’


Too few know the history of the Nazi methodical mass murder of disabled people. That is why I write.

By Kenny Fries The New York Times


Mr. Fries is the author, most recently, of “In the Province of the Gods.”

My first visit to the Aktion T4 killing site at Brandenburg an der Havel was in autumn. My destination, where 9,000 disabled people were murdered as part of the Nazi “euthanasia” program, is embedded in the activities of the town — trams and buses, stores, a bank, a cafe. 

The buildings that were once the old prison were mostly destroyed during the war. If not for dark gray letters painted on one side of the light gray building — GEDENKSTÄTTE, on one side, and its English translation, MEMORIAL, on another — the site could easily be passed unnoticed. From a distance, it looks prefab, temporary, perhaps an ad hoc extension to an overcrowded school or municipal department. 

Though it was October, I was thinking of winter. At the Nuremberg “Doctors’ Trial” in 1947, Viktor Brack — the economist, SS officer and head of the office of the Chancellery of the Führer who was in charge of Aktion T4 — testified that the first of the mass murders of disabled people happened “in snow-covered Brandenburg on a winter’s day in December 1939 or January 1940.” The exact date of this “test killing” has not yet been determined. 

No documents from the “test killing” have been preserved. According to information at the memorial, “Who the murdered patients were and where they came from is unknown.” What is known comes primarily from postwar testimony of those involved, or thought to be involved, in what took place that day. 

Unlike the Holocaust, there are no T4 survivors. We know about T4 and its aftermath mainly through medical records and from the perpetrators. Aktion T4 does not have its Elie Wiesel or Primo Levi. 

That is the main reason I write about what happened to disabled people during the Third Reich. I want to be what Susanne C. Knittel and other scholars call a “vicarious witness.” Ms. Knittel describes this not as “an act of speaking for and thus appropriating the memory and story of someone else but rather an attempt to bridge the silence through narrative means.” This is my way of bridging the silence, of keeping alive something that is too often forgotten. 

I’m not surprised that some of the perpetrators’ testimony is contradictory. In his diary, Dr. Irmfried Eberl, the medical director at Brandenburg, mentions Jan. 18, 1940, as the date of the “test killing.” However, Dr. Horst Schumann, whom we know to have been present at the event, was on that day at Grafeneck, where he would oversee mass killings, the first of which occurred on Jan. 18. Another T4 employee said the murder of patients in Grafeneck started “about 14 days” after the “test killing” in Brandenburg. It seems Eberl mixed up the dates of the two killings. 

After he was arrested in 1959, Werner Heyde, a psychiatrist and the medical director of the T4 program, placed the “test killing” at the “beginning of January 1940.” Heyde confessed to being only an observer. 

The German Meteorological Office records the first major snowfall of the 1939-40 winter in Brandenburg on New Year’s Eve, 1939; December had been relatively dry. Brack, in his testimony, was very clear about the snow on the ground at Brandenburg for the “test killing.” By deduction, it seems that the first Brandenburg mass murder took place during the first days of January 1940. 

Though the exact date is somewhat speculative, the words of those responsible for the murder of 70,000 disabled people in Aktion T4, and the 230,000 killed after the program’s official end, clearly speak to the main cause for what happened: the disvaluing of disabled lives. Eugenics, which was rampant before and during the Reich, provided the rationale for the killings, stigmatizing those with disabilities as not human. 

Dr. Albert Widmann, a chemist, forensic scientist and head of the chemical department of the central offices of the Reich Detective Forces, testified that he was asked to procure poison in large quantities. At a meeting with an unidentified representative of the Chancellery of the Führer, Widmann asked, “What for? To kill people?” 

“No,” was the reply. “Animals in the form of humans.” 

It was the police chemist Dr. August Becker who prepared the carbon monoxide gas for what he called the “euthanasia experiment.” Testifying in the 1960s, Becker also echoed eugenic depictions of the disabled. He recalled looking through the gas chamber peephole and observing “the behavior of the delinquents,” as the gas filled up the chamber and the victims’ lungs. Becker’s depiction likens disabled people to the immoral and illegal. 

Becker described, in detail, the gas chamber as “a room similar to a shower room, lined with tiles about three by five meter[s], and three meters high in size.” According to Becker, between 18 and 20 patients were led by nurses into this “shower room.” These men had to “undress in an anteroom, so they were totally naked.” Becker pointed to Widmann as the one who “operated the gas installation.” But Widmann always denied taking part. 

When interrogated in 1947, Richard von Hegener, deputy head of the killing of disabled children, named “the chemist in charge, Dr. Becker” as the one “who let the CO gas into the room.” Von Hegener said there were 30 patients “dressed only in institutional clothing,” who “were led in and they calmly took a seat on the benches in the room without any resistance.” 

Heyde stated there were “10, at most 15 — the figure was more than 10 — mentally ill patients.” He said, “I don’t really know who let the gas in.” 

According to Brack, there were “four such patients,” all men, whom he described, in another eugenic nod, as “incurable.” When asked about their ages or from which institutions they came he replied, “I really don’t have any memory of that anymore.” 

The more I learn, the more I understand the connection between Aktion T4 and what happened later to Jews and others deemed “undesirable.” The Brandenburg “test killing” demonstrated that gassing was a “suitable” means for mass murder. 

And as the text at the memorial emphasizes, “it also gave the future ‘killing doctors’ the chance to familiarize with the method.” After recommending carbon monoxide for the mass murder of the disabled, Widmann developed the gas wagons that were used for the subsequent mass murder of Jews on the war’s eastern front. Becker helped design these mobile killing units, including those used by the notorious Einsatzgruppen in the Nazi-occupied areas of the Soviet Union. Eberl later worked at the Chelmno and Treblinka extermination camps during Operation Reinhard, the “Final Solution.” 

Of those whose testimonies are highlighted at the Brandenburg memorial, Brack, in 1948, was the only one executed. Von Hegener was arrested in 1949 and sentenced to life imprisonment but was released early. Becker had a stroke in 1959 and was deemed unfit to stand trial. Heyde was arrested in 1959 and committed suicide before his trial. In both 1962 and 1967 Widmann was convicted to serve several years in prison but was released upon payment of a fine. 

Outside the memorial building, there is no cemetery. Across a parking lot lies a large plot of gray gravel, interrupted only by the reddish-brown brick foundations of what was the prison barn, which housed the gas chamber. There are circles of piled leaves among the gravel — as if these random forms were gathered in a subliminal ritual of mourning.